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ABSTRACT  
 
Toivanen, Mervi* (2009). Financial Interlinkages and Risk of Contagion in the Finnish Inter-
bank Market. University of Vaasa, Department of Economics Working Papers 11, 38 p. 
 
 
Using the maximum entropy method, this paper estimates the danger of contagion on 
the Finnish interbank market in 2005–2007 as well as the existence of contagion during 
a Finnish banking crisis. The contagion analysis of the early 1990s is able to predict the 
most troublesome and defaulting banks in the banking sector. The simulation results for 
2005–2007 suggest that five deposit banks out of ten are possible starting points for 
contagious effects. The magnitude of contagion is conditional on the first failing bank. 
In addition to large commercial banks, middle-sized banks also cause damaging domino 
effects. Over the last few years, the negative effects of contagion on the Finnish banking 
sector have been, on average, more limited than those of the early 1990s. The contagion 
is currently a low probability event on the Finnish interbank market.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Crises in banking sectors occur from time to time and generally incur negative effects 
and expenses for the whole national economy. Recently, financial stability has deterio-
rated globally due to the US sub-prime crisis, which has increased market speculation, 
made banks reluctant to lend to each other and tightened lending policies in interbank 
markets. As instability is highly undesirable, it is essential to understand the functioning 
of interbank markets, the risks involved and the transmission mechanism of such risks.  
 
One of the possible transmission channels for financial risks is contagion between fi-
nancial sector intermediaries. Credit risk associated with interbank lending may lead to 
domino effects, where the failure of a bank results in the failure of other banks even if 
the latter are not directly affected by the initial shock or do not hold open positions with 
the initially failing bank. A more profound understanding of these contagion mecha-
nisms and channels may help supervisors to better focus their limited resources when 
attempting to confine emerging financial crises. Moreover, increasing knowledge of po-
tential contagion effects may encourage market participants to pay due attention to risk 
prevention and lessen the danger of "moral hazard", i.e. careless lending and a disregard 
for the counterparty's credit limits and creditworthiness.  
 
This paper is related to studies that use interbank lending as a basis for contagion analy-
ses. The contagion analysis outlined here focuses on the Finnish interbank market using 
Finnish data for 2005–2007. It also tests the method of maximum entropy by using Fin-
nish banking crisis data for 1988–1990. As the main consequences of the banking crisis 
for the Finnish banking sector are known, it is interesting to test whether contagion 
analysis could have identified the problematic banks before the crisis hits.   
 
In the literature, there is a considerable amount of ambiguity concerning the definition 
of contagion: no theoretical or empirical identification procedure exists on which schol-
ars agree (Pericoli & Sbracia 2003: 572). Nevertheless, contagion in banking markets is 
generally defined as a crisis that spills over from one institution to another. Since banks 
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act in the very centre of the financial system, they are usually the main target of re-
search and analysis.  
 
The academic literature on this topic comprises both theoretical models for analyzing 
specific aspects of contagion, and empirical analyses of markets. One of the theoretical 
frameworks is presented by Allen & Gale (2000). They show that the spreading of a fi-
nancial crisis depends crucially on the interconnectedness of the banking sector and its 
patterns. If the interbank market is complete and each region is connected to all other 
regions, the initial impact of a financial crisis in one region may be attenuated. If the 
interbank market is incomplete, each region is connected with a small number of other 
regions. In that case, the initial impact of a financial crisis may be felt strongly in 
neighbouring regions. 
 
The empirical research on contagion focuses most commonly on so-called financial 
contagion through linkages between banks.
1
 Linkages consist of financial exposures in 
the banking sector. Contagion may occur through two channels. Firstly, the problems of 
one bank may cause losses to creditor banks (the "exposure contagion channel"). Sec-
ondly, problems may jeopardize the liquidity of a potential debtor, i.e., of a bank which 
finds that a credit line it holds with the troubled institution has dried up (the "credit line 
contagion channel"). (Blåvarg & Nimander 2002: 20; Müller 2006: 38) 
 
Empirical studies have so far concentrated on national banking systems, using two 
methodological approaches. The first approach simulates the effects of a bank failure. 
Upper & Worms (2004) were the first to use the method of maximizing entropy to esti-
mate the distribution of individual banks' interbank loans and deposits and to analyze 
the possibility of contagion in the German banking sector. Their methodology has been 
widely adapted and similar studies have been carried out on the Swiss (Sheldon & 
Maurer 1998), Belgian (Degryse & Nguyen 2007), English (Wells 2002 & 2004), Dutch 
(van Lelyveld & Liedorp 2006) and Italian (Mistrulli 2007) interbank markets. In gen-
                                                 
1
 Contagion can also be indirect. In that case, contagion is driven by information or by the sale of illiquid 
assets by distressed banks to meet regulatory capital requirements. Moreover, the failure of a large num-
ber of banks could as well be the result of a macroeconomic shock that affects institutions exposed to a 
common risk more or less simultaneously. (Blåvarg & Nimander 2002; Müller 2006) 
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eral, all these authors found the potential for significant contagion effects but regarded a 
substantial weakening of the whole banking sector as unlikely. The effects of the worst-
case scenarios differ according to the losses-given-defaults. With smaller values of the 
loss-given-default, the effect of contagion is lower. If the loss-given-default is 100%, 
the contagion seems to be the most severe in the Netherlands (73–96 % of the national 
banking sector's balance sheets affected by contagion). The effect is the least severe in 
Belgium, provided that a Belgian bank fails first. The contagion in the other countries 
varies from 13% to 42%.  
 
A second approach estimates contagion by considering a wider variety of risks and fac-
tors. Müller (2006) tests the general stability of the Swiss interbank market by develop-
ing a simulation approach. The emphasis of the paper is less on individual banks and 
more on the banking system's exposure to aggregate risk stemming from a market's 
network structure. The possibility of contagion is evaluated by solving a clearing prob-
lem of a multilateral, complex bank network model with the help of a recursive algo-
rithm. Elsinger, Lehar & Summer (2002) use standard risk management techniques in 
combination with a network model of interbank exposures to analyze the consequences 
of macroeconomic shocks for bank insolvency risk. They consider interest rate shocks, 
exchange rate and stock market movements as well as shocks related to the business cy-
cle. Gropp, Lo Duca & Vesala (2006) use the distance-to-default indicator, a multi-
nominal logit model and "coexceedances" to study contagion risk in the European bank-
ing market. In addition, Blåvarg et al. (2002) have published a descriptive analysis of 
the Swedish banking sector's counterparty risks. 
 
Since Finnish banks do not have to disclose their counterparties, very little is known 
about the actual structure of bilateral exposures on the Finnish interbank markets and 
how these relationships affect the danger of contagion. Therefore, one has to use identi-
fying approximations to estimate bilateral exposures. The present paper follows the 
methodology of Upper et al. (2004), who estimate a distribution of interbank loans and 
deposits by "maximizing the entropy". Finnish banks’ bilateral exposure matrices are 
constructed by using available data on bank balance sheets and counterparty exposures. 
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The danger of contagion is assessed by letting every bank go bankrupt one at a time and 
computing the effect of this failure on the other banks.  
 
The analyses for 2005–2007 suggest that contagion is currently a low probability event 
on the Finnish interbank market. In addition to large commercial banks, middle-sized 
banks are also capable of triggering broad, systemic contagion. The analysis of the 
banking crisis era shows how the risk of contagion increases the crisis a priori. In the 
light of historic knowledge, the maximum entropy methodology is able to pick up the 
financial institutions that formed a systemic risk to Finnish banking system. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the Finnish banking sector in general and 
interbank market in particular are described in section 2. The methodology for con-
structing bilateral matrices and simulating contagious effects is clarified in section 3. 
Section 4 concentrates on a description of the data sets, on the choice of simulation pa-
rameters and on the results of the analyses. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
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2. BANKING SECTOR IN FINLAND 
 
 
The Finnish banking market consists of about 360 individual credit institutions. Several 
of these institutions are, however, part of a larger consolidated corporation. According 
to their balance sheets, the main banking groups in Finland are: Nordea Bank Finland, 
Sampo Bank, OP-Pohjola Group, savings banks (incl. Aktia), local cooperative banks 
and Bank of Åland plc. The Finnish banking sector is highly concentrated, as the three 
main players account for more than 90% of the total market. However, many new credit 
institutions such as Tapiola Bank have been established in Finland in recent years. Al-
though these new banks are rather small players in the market, they have been able to 
expand their business gradually. In addition, the business of mortgage banks has in-
creased.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Interbank linkages on the Finnish banking market. 
 
 
Aktia 
Local co-operative banks 
Evli 
Local co-operative banks in 
OP-Pohjola Group 
Pohjola Sampo Nordea 
Eq Tapiola 
savings banks 
Bank of Åland 
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The linkages between Finnish banks are roughly portrayed in Figure 1. The Finnish in-
terbank sector is, in principle, three-layered. The largest banks (Nordea, Sampo and 
Pohjola) have the room to manoeuvre either on domestic or on international money 
markets. The ability to access international capital markets reduces their dependence on 
the national interbank market. They can also interact with each other by loaning and de-
positing funds with each other. The second layer is formed by middle-sized institutions 
like Aktia and Bank of Åland. These banks can acquire funding from larger banks 
which act as financiers for other Finnish banks. Middle-sized institutions can also (to a 
lesser extent than larger banks) take benefit from international markets. Finally, the 
third layer is comprised of small, local banks that use other banks as their central financ-
ing institutions. For example, local savings banks and local co-operative banks use Ak-
tia as their central financial institution. In a similar fashion, Pohjola finances local co-
operative banks that belong to the OP-Pohjola Group.  
 
Before the banking crisis that occurred in the 1980s, the Finnish banking market con-
sisted of ten major deposit banks, namely KOP, SYP (Unitas), savings banks, OKO 
Bank, Postbank, Skopbank, STS Bank and Bank of Åland. Among these institutions, 
KOP and SYP were the largest ones and fierce rivals. The third largest banking group 
comprised savings banks, for which Skopbank acted as a central financial institution. 
OKO Bank financed local co-operative banks that belonged to the OP Bank Group. 
Postbank was government-owned and the other banks were rather small. The Finnish 
banking market was already then highly concentrated.  
 
Table 1 shows the total assets of Finnish banks as well as interbank liabilities in propor-
tion to the banks' total assets in 1988 and in 2006. At a maximum, interbank liabilities 
were approximately one fifth of total assets in 2006. But the share varies across institu-
tions. Percentage shares have remained at similar levels over the years although there 
are currently fewer banks whose exposures exceed 10% of total assets. In the 1980s, 
interbank lending was predominantly domestic, and individual banks held quite large 
interbank positions in other Finnish banks.  
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Table 1. Finnish deposit banks' total assets and share of interbank liabilities in 1988 and 
in 2006.   
 
Total assets, 
EUR million
Interbank liabilities 
relative to total 
assets, %
Total assets, 
EUR million
Interbank liabilities 
relative to total 
assets, %
KOP 24 322 1.2 %  -  -
SYP (Unitas) 22 305 0.5 %  -  -
Savings banks 16 643 14.5 % 5 648 1.0 %
Postbank 12 582 0.7 %  -  -
Skopbank 10 681 11.5 %  -  -
OKO (Pohjola) Bank 7 375 16.2 % 24 196 4.5 %
STS -Bank 1 832 10.2 %  -  -
Bank of Åland 462 11.1 % 2 189 2.8 %
Nordea Bank Finland  -  - 130 985 22.3 %
Sampo Bank  -  - 26 627 1.8 %
Aktia plc  -  - 5 492 16.2 %
Local co-operative banks  -  - 3 467 0.2 %
Evli Bank  -  - 698 10.7 %
eQ Bank  -  - 627 0.0 %
Tapiola Bank  -  - 546 0.0 %
Source: banks' annual reports
1988 2006
 
 
 
Nowadays, Finnish banks' interbank lending has become more international in nature. 
Finnish banks' unsecured receivables from financial institutions rose steadily from 2006 
to 2007 (Table 2). By June 2007, the share of Finnish counterparties was exceptionally 
low and at the same time the share of Norwegian, Danish and Icelandic counterparties 
had grown. Nordic, German and English banks are the main international counterparties 
for Finnish banks and thus they are the potential channels through which international 
contagion or market disturbances may spread to Finland. 
 
Table 2. Finnish banks' unsecured receivables classified by country. 
 
EUR Million Share of countries of total assets in EUR million.
Finnish 
banks
Swedish 
banks
Other 
Nordic 
banks
German 
banks
English 
banks
Other 
European 
banks
Banks from 
USA
 December 2006 14 621 26.9 % 9.7 % 13.6 % 15.3 % 20.4 % 8.3 % 5.8 %
 June 2007 16 853 6.0 % 5.9 % 32.9 % 20.0 % 17.5 % 9.5 % 8.1 %
 December 2007 19 169 16.5 % 5.3 % 35.5 % 11.4 % 13.4 % 9.7 % 8.1 %  
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3. METHODOLOGY FOR CONTAGION RESEARCH 
 
 
3.1. Constructing bilateral matrices 
 
 
The data on bilateral lending relationships is most often estimated, as researchers do not 
usually have complete information on individual banks' actual counterparty loan expo-
sures. The available data is usually obtained from balance sheets, large exposures and 
credit register reports that banks have to submit to authorities, but the availability of 
data differs across countries and over time periods. In order to fill in the gaps in these 
data sets, the estimation methodology has been based on the concept of "maximizing 
entropy". (Upper 2007: 5) 
 
The concept of entropy maximization originates in information theory, in which entropy 
is a measure of the average information content of a random variable (or similarly a 
measure of the uncertainty associated with a random variable). The greater the entropy 
of the message, the greater the information the message contains.  
 
Maximizing entropy means setting up probability distributions on the basis of partial 
knowledge and thus, it denotes the most likely outcome given the a priori knowledge 
about the event. Mathematically, a discrete random variable X can take on possible val-
ues {x: i = 1, …, n} and the entropy is defined as  
 
(2.1.) H(X) = )(log)(
1
i
n
i
i xpxp  
 
where p(xi) is the probability mass function of outcome xi. (Jaynes 1957; Shannon 
1948) The lower the probability p(xi), i.e. p(xi) → 0, the higher the uncertainty,           
i.e. -log p(xi) → 0, for the outcome xi.  When the probability of the outcome is maxi-
mized, the uncertainty diminishes. And when the probability is high and the uncertainty 
is small, estimates for parameters xi are close to real values of xi. Thus, the maximum 
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entropy estimate is the least biased estimate that can be made on the basis of the avail-
able information.  
 
The concept of the entropy maximization gives a building block to solve the problem of 
data inconsistency. These problems are also known as balancing the matrix or minimiz-
ing the relative entropy. Matrix is defined to be balanced if it satisfies the given set of 
linear restrictions of the problem. The problem of matrix estimation (and the entropy 
minimization) is posed as: "Given a matrix C, determine a matrix X that is close to ma-
trix C and satisfies a given set of linear conditions on its entries". These doubly con-
strained minimum-information models are obtained into the use of economics. (Censor 
& Zenios 1997: 237, 242, 245; Blien & Graef 1998)  
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Figure 2. N*N matrix of interbank loans and deposits. 
 
 
Suppose that there are N banks that may lend to each other. In this case, the interbank 
lending relationships can be presented in the N * N matrix (Figure 2). Let this matrix be 
referred to as X. The row and column sums are bank i's total claims on other banks and 
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bank j's liabilities in the interbank market, respectively. The row (a = assets) and col-
umn (l = liabilities) sums are received from data sets. As there is usually no knowledge 
on individual interbank loans and deposits, individual xij:s are unknown. The diagonal 
of the N*N matrix is usually set at zero, since no bank lends to itself. (Upper 2007: 4)  
 
If a researcher has some kind of a priori knowledge and/or data on actual individual in-
terbank relationships and their magnitude, the knowledge is gathered into an a priori 
matrix C that is also an N * N matrix and resembles matrix X. Frequently, matrix C is 
needs be adjusted so that the row and column totals equal fixed positive values, ie. the 
row and column totals of matrix X. Balancing the matrix yields a unique estimate of 
matrix X. More formally, the problem is as follows: 
 
(2.2.) 
ijx
Min
ij
ij
n
j
ij
n
i c
x
x log
11
 
 
(2.3.)  s.t.   j
n
i
ij lx
1
      , i = 1, … , n 
 
(2.4.) i
n
j
ij ax
1
      , j = 1, … , n 
  
(2.5.) 0ijx  
 
If bilateral exposures are estimated using the balance sheet data, a requirement for the 
estimation is the availability of balance sheets of all potential counterparties for a given 
balance sheet item. In practice, this has limited the use of this method to lending be-
tween domestic institutions. (Upper 2007: 5)  
 
The entropy will be maximized when the probability distribution is uniform. Thus, in 
the present context of the paper, maximizing the entropy includes the idea that banks 
spread their lending as evenly as possible between other banks in the market. And 
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maximizing the entropy corresponds to the most likely structure of lending given all a 
priori pieces of information on the interbank market. (Upper 2007: 5)  
 
 
3.2. Simulating contagion 
 
 
Once the matrix of interbank linkages is in place, the researcher has to specify the type 
of the shock that triggers the contagion (Upper 2007: 7). Usually, the scope of contagion 
is estimated by letting banks go bankrupt one at a time and measuring the number of 
banks that fail owing to their direct or indirect exposure to the failing bank. A lender 
defaults if the amount of the losses suffered by lending to the failed bank is greater than 
the lender's own capital. Contagion need not be confined to such first-round effects, but 
a failure of the first bank can trigger a whole chain of failures (the domino effect).  
 
The simplest approach is a simple sequential (or round-by-round) algorithm for simula-
tions. As in several earlier studies the algorithm is also used in this paper. At the begin-
ning, there are several banks b, b = 1,…,N, in the banking sector. All these banks hold 
capital cb as well as an exposure xbb towards another bank. Contagion simulation in-
volves the following steps (Figure 3):  
 
1. By assumption, bank i fails at t0. 
2. Any bank j fails if its exposure towards bank i, xji, multiplied by an exoge-
nously given parameter for the loss rate (LGD aka loss-given-default), ex-
ceeds the bank j's capital cj. So, bank j fails if LGD * xji > cj at t1. 
3. A second round of contagion occurs for any bank k for whom LGD * (xki + 
xkj) > ck at t2. Contagion stops if no additional banks go bankrupt. Otherwise, 
a third round of contagion takes place. (Upper 2007: 7) 
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Figure 3. Algorithm for contagion simulations. 
Banks' solvency ratios at t0 
Bank i fails and is unable to pay 
back its interbank loans 
Banks' solvency ratios at t1 
All solvency ratios above 8 % Bank k's solvency ratio un-
der 8 % and it fails. Conse-
quently, bank k cannot pay 
its liabilities. 
Existing banks' solvency 
ratios at t2 
 
No contagion 
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4. ESTIMATING THE DANGER OF CONTAGION ON THE FINNISH IN-
TERBANK MARKET 
 
 
4.1. Data description 
 
 
The basic analysis of the Finnish interbank market presented here is based on counter-
party exposure, balance sheet and liquidity risk data. Counterparty exposure data give 
an accurate snapshot of interbank business, but the data fails to cover connections 
among all banks in the Finnish interbank market.
2
 At the end of 2007, six Finnish de-
posit banks' receivables from the ten largest counterparties comprised 28% of all banks' 
total receivables from financial institutions. In order to get the whole picture of the in-
terbank market, one needs to rely also on balance sheet data. Balance sheets include 
quarterly information on loans and receivables to and from financial institutions as well 
as on bonds and certificates of deposit. These instruments are divided into domestic and 
foreign items that facilitate the contagion analysis by letting one concentrate on domes-
tic exposures. Thus, balance sheet information is used for total claims and total liabili-
ties in matrix X while counterparty exposure data is used in matrix C to give more accu-
rate estimations of relationships among the six Finnish banks. Further, liquidity risk 
data
3
 is used to clarify the interbank relationship among small local banks and their cen-
tral financial institutions in matrix C. The analysis of the banking crisis in 1988–90 is 
based only on balance sheet data, since counterparty exposures and liquidity risk data 
were not yet collected at the time.  
                                                 
2
 Data collection by the Finnish Financial Supervision Authority includes deposit banks whose balance 
sheet total exceeds 1 billion euros or that have more than 100 million euros worth of certificates of claims 
eligible for central bank financing. Thus, only six deposit banks (namely, Nordea Bank Finland, Sampo 
Bank, Pohjola Bank plc (former OKO plc), Aktia Savings Bank, Bank of Åland and Evli plc) report in-
formation on their 10 largest counterparties that are financial institutions and 10 largest counterparties 
that are non-financial firms and communities. The bi-annual data refers only to interbank loans and de-
posits and does not include single household customers. The data set is on the group level and includes 
information on unsecured and secured loans. Unsecured claims of banking groups are divided into sub-
groups like lending and securities (including certificates of deposit), settlement claims, shares and deriva-
tives. Repurchasing agreements are singled out from all secured claims. 
3 The data set includes information on interbank deposits and loans among Aktia on one side and local co-
operative banks and savings banks on the other side. There is also similar data for Pohjola Bank and co-
operative banks in the OP-Pohjola Group.  
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Contagion analyses for 2005–2007 and for the banking crisis period (1988–1990) in-
clude major Finnish deposit banks.
4
  In order to obtain a closed system in which, in 
principle, all interbank deposits and loans add up to zero, only lending between domes-
tic banks is considered, i.e. all business with foreign banks is excluded. Subtracting in-
ternational interbank lending leads, in practice, to a situation in which discrepancies be-
tween the total assets and liabilities of the Finnish banking sector arise. Although this is 
in a way normal, as banks can be either net lenders or net borrowers in the interbank 
market, it complicates the running of the data estimation algorithm. For this reason, the 
individual liabilities positions were scaled so that their sum fits with that of the total as-
set positions. In December 2006, 66% of all interbank assets and 58% of liabilities were 
with Finnish deposit banks. Among the observations, the highest share of domestic as-
sets and liabilities was 100% while the lowest share for assets was 8% and that for li-
abilities 0%.  
 
Using the maximum entropy method, the balance sheet data permits us to compute two 
matrices of bilateral exposures. These sub-matrices are formed for loans and receivables 
and for bonds and certificates of deposit. After having constructed a bank-to-bank ma-
trix for the sub-categories, these matrices have been combined to total domestic expo-
sure matrix.
5
 This composite matrix has then been used to test the possibility of conta-
gion on the Finnish interbank market. It is important to note that the analysis concen-
trates exclusively on contagion due to credit exposures in the interbank market. The 
analyses do not include exposures arising from payment or security settlement systems 
or exposures due to the cross-holding of securities. Due to the data limitations, counter-
party risks that are not recorded in the balance sheet are not captured either.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 
Nordea Bank Finland, Sampo Bank, Pohjola plc (former OKO plc), Aktia Savings Bank, Bank of Åland, 
Evli plc, eQ Bank, Tapiola Bank, local co-operative banks and local savings banks for January 2005, De-
cember 2006, June 2007 and December 2007. KOP, OKO Bank, SYP (Unitas), savings banks, Postbank, 
Skopbank, STS Bank and Bank of Åland are included in the banking crisis period. 
5
 Bilateral matrices could also be formed on the basis of aggregated interbank assets and liabilities. It is, 
however, unappealing, since bank's positions in different instrument categories can differ substantially. 
Aggregation may, therefore, level out individual positions and weaken estimation results.  
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4.2. The choice of loss-given-default and the solvency ratio 
 
 
The key parameters in determining the existence of contagion are the loss-given-default 
(LGD) ratio and the solvency ratio (usually congruent with capital adequacy require-
ments). The LGD -ratio refers to the share of assets that cannot be recovered in the case 
of bankruptcy. The solvency ratio is a limit for a default. The choice of the LGD -ratio 
is by no means obvious. Upper et al. (2004: 838–839) trace back several episodes of 
banking crises and find that the ratio varies significantly. For example, in the mid-1980s 
the average loss realised in bank defaults was 30% of the book value of the banks’ as-
sets in the United States. In the case of the bankruptcy of The Bank of Credit and Com-
merce International (BCCI) the creditors first expected to suffer losses up to 90%. Even-
tually, they ended up recovering more than half of their deposits. The uncertainty about 
eventual recoveries, combined with the time it takes for creditors to get their money, 
suggest that it may not be the actual losses borne by the creditor banks but the expected 
losses at the moment of failure that matter.  
 
The loss ratio depends also on the availability of the collateral on interbank claims vis-
à-vis other creditors. The Finnish balance sheet data does not, unfortunately, provide 
information on the collateralization of loans. According to the counterparty exposure 
data, most of the loans reported are uncollateralized and the share of collateralized lend-
ing is almost non-existent. Since the purpose of the study is to find the maximum nega-
tive shock that could hit the Finnish banking market, it is assumed that most of the in-
terbank loans reported in the balance sheet are indeed unsecured. Given the difficulties 
in determining the appropriate loss rate, the possibility of contagion is tested using the 
broad-ranging values for the LGD. In practice, the loss ratio receives four different val-
ues, namely 100%, 75%, 50% and 25%. The loss ratio remains constant across banks.  
 
The 8% solvency ratio is one of the limits for bank default. It is a limit defined by regu-
latory authorities and it shows if a bank is — for the time being — solvent enough to 
fulfil its obligations towards other remaining banks in the interbank market. In reality, 
banks seldom go bankrupt out of the blue; there are at least some rumours about the dif-
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ficulties beforehand. Therefore, regulatory powers may be ready to take action if 
needed. As Upper et al. (2004: 842–843) state, it may be possible to stop the most se-
vere scenarios with relatively low costs at an early stage, i.e. before the dramatic wave 
of bank failures sets in. A bank can be either closed down or refinanced through special 
financing operations. However, domino effects take place instantaneously. This preven-
tive closure may be deemed unrealistic due to the fact that contagion may occur in a 
very short time period, which precludes regulatory action. In practice, it may take some 
time before banks realise the losses they have incurred but, even so, late rounds can oc-
cur quickly after the initial shock. This means that there may be virtually no possibility 
for a regulator to react to a process once it has started. As the focus here is on the 
maximal negative effect in the interbank market and on the contagion effects occurring 
in a short time period, it is assumed that regulators do not have time to react to the col-
lapse of a bank.  
 
In the simulations, bank institutions stand alone. In reality this may not always be the 
case, since several Finnish banks are part of a larger consolidated corporation. In 
addition to the banking arm, the group of companies may also include insurance 
business, investment funds and real estate business. Thus, when facing difficulties, a 
corporation may direct funding to its problematic banking business. This funding can 
extend the bank's ability to sustain market turbulence and restrain contagion. 
Nevertheless, banks need to fulfil their obligations related to the solvency ratio. As the 
simulations are static in nature, it is assumed here that corporations do not have enough 
time to raise the required funding and save their banking arm. It is also assumed that 
there is no extra funding available from interbank markets. In addition, in the analyses 
presented here there are no other safety nets on which banks could rely in case of 
problems. 
 
Simulations focus on gross exposures and do not take netting into account. As we are 
searching here for a maximum exposure and assume that contagion proceeds without 
delays, netting is not an option. Moreover, in Finland banks cannot net interbank claims 
that can be used as collateral for central bank funding. What happens after all contagion 
rounds and the bankruptcy of a bank is outside the scope of this paper.  
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4.3. The risk of contagion  
 
 
According to simulations for 2005–2007, contagion may occur on the Finnish interbank 
market (Figure 4 and Appendix 1). However, contagion is a low probability event. Dur-
ing the estimation period, five banks out of the ten may trigger contagion in the market.
6
 
In addition to the large commercial banks, there are also middle-sized banks that are 
capable of producing negative effects. The volume of contagion depends greatly on the 
bank that goes into bankruptcy first. If the loss rate is 100%, banks J, C and H are sys-
tematically so important that they can threaten the whole banking system. Contagion 
caused by banks C and H vanishes if the loss rate decreases below 100%. With smaller 
losses given defaults, bank D is systematically riskier as it is able to affect negatively 
10-30% of the banking market. 
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Figure 4. Contagion in the Finnish banking system at the end of December 2007. 
 
                                                 
6
 Local co-operative banks and local savings banks are both merged into groups. 
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The five banks that are identified as a starting point for contagion remain the same from 
2005 to 2007. Bank D is potentially the most contagious in the Finnish banking system. 
It is able to cause mayhem in the market with the smallest loss ratio and, on average, it 
causes the largest share of the Finnish banking system to collapse. In the long run, bank 
J's importance has grown and currently it is systematically so important that it can 
threaten the whole banking system. To a lesser extent, banks C and A can also cause 
problems in the interbank market. Bank H’s importance has grown only recently as the 
contagion originating from bank H had earlier only very limited effects on the Finnish 
banking system.  
 
The effect of contagion on local communities is also estimated by letting local co-
operative banks and local savings banks be entered into the calculations as individual 
banks. In reality, local co-operative banks and local savings banks are indeed not liable 
for each others' debts. In this set-up, there are 42 local co-operative banks, 39 local sav-
ings banks and 8 commercial banks. The change in the results on the overall banking 
sector due to this new set-up is negligible. Depending on the loss rate, the difference in 
magnitude between the contagion of the first set-up and that of the second varies from 
0% to 2.5%. 
 
Table 3.  Failing local banks' total assets in the second set-up in relation to total assets 
of local banks. 
 
Loss ratio
25 % 50 % 75 % 100 %
Local co-operative banks 6.0 % 48.0 % 81.2 % 95.1 %
Local savings banks 5.8 % 25.2 % 64.4 % 67.5 %
 
 
 
From the perspective of local people and local communities, the issue is not so trivial. 
Table 3 shows how large a share of local co-operative and local savings banks fail in the 
second set-up in proportion to the first set-up, in which all local banks are deemed to 
collapse instantaneously. The difference in results is considerable with the smallest loss 
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ratio. For instance, in the second set-up only 6% of local co-operative banks go into 
bankruptcy, in comparison to the first set-up, in which all local co-operative banks were 
deemed insolvent. The gap between the results diminishes when the loss-given-default 
increases. 
 
The liberalization of the Finnish financial market in the middle of 1980s planted the 
seeds of the banking crisis as it increased the demand for loans and the loan stock 
started to expand rapidly as banks competed fiercely over market shares in household 
and corporate lending. The interbank market was opened up between Finnish banks in 
1986 and banks started to finance their growing lending by acquiring funding from 
money markets. Thus, banks were exposed to increasing interest and loan loss risks. Fi-
nally, the banking crisis was trigged by the depression, the collapse of exports to the 
Soviet Union, the devaluation of the Finnish currency and steeply rising interest rates.
7
   
 
During the years 1988-1990 and at the beginning of the banking crisis, there were three 
groups that were able to trigger contagion, namely Skopbank, savings banks and OKO 
Bank (Figure 5 and Appendix 1). At the beginning of the 1980s, Skopbank's and sav-
ings banks' lending increased aggressively and as restrictions in money markets were 
lessened, they turned to money markets to acquire more funding in addition to deposits. 
Their strategy was to acquire funding from short-term money markets and invest in 
long-term assets. At the same time, Skopbank acted as a central financial institution for 
the whole savings bank group. If Skopbank had failed in 1988, contagion would have 
affected 26% of banking sector assets (presuming a 100% loss ratio). At the end of 
1990, Skopbank's failure would have affected 41% of total assets. In 1988 and in 1990, 
the failure of savings banks would have caused about 5 percentage points lower nega-
tive effects on the banking sector's total assets than the failure of Skopbank.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 The evolution of the Finnish banking crisis is described in detail in Nyberg & Vihriälä (1994). 
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Figure 5. Contagion on the Finnish banking system at the end of 1990. 
 
The fact that the analysis identifies OKO Bank as the most severe source of contagion 
during 1988–1990 is some sort of a revelation. The OP Bank Group did have trouble 
during the crisis but it is generally acknowledged that the Group was able to survive due 
to their more conservative strategy and the Group's joint responsibility in dealing with 
loan losses. The results are most likely driven to some extent by the fact that OKO Bank 
acts as a central financial institution for the co-operative banking group. But after the 
deregulation of financial markets, market funding began to constitute an increasing 
share of OKO's assets and liabilities. Therefore, if there had not been joint responsibility 
in the Group, OKO might have encountered problems.  
 
In the light of the historic knowledge, the maximum entropy method is able to separate 
out the most troublesome banks in the banking sector.
8
 When the overall economic situ-
                                                 
8 The contagion analysis is also replicated with 1994 and 1996 data. However, these data points are prob-
lematic, since banks received substantial subsidies from the government. Even though the overall eco-
nomic situation improved little by little, banks continued to incur substantial losses during 1991–1995. At 
the end of 1994, only OKO Bank and Postbank were able to trigger contagion while at the end of 1996 
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ation weakened, banks' loan losses started to accumulate and their situation worsened 
rapidly. Growing market-based funding increased the risk of contagion in the Finnish 
banking sector from 1988 to 1990. Skopbank's strategy was highly dependent on the 
availability of market funding and as Skopbank’s loan losses soared, markets became 
highly suspicious of Skopbank’s ability to fulfil its obligations. The lack of confidence 
prevailing on the national money market in the bank's operational wherewithal in-
creased and finally Skopbank’s liquidity collapsed on 19 September 1991 when other 
banks refused to buy Skopbank’s certificates of deposit. To prevent the whole banking 
system from collapsing, the Bank of Finland stepped in and took Skopbank over.  
 
The savings banks' situation worsened when loan losses doubled and the costs of market 
funding increased due to rising interest rates. Ultimately, savings banks that were on the 
brink of collapse merged into the Savings Bank of Finland (SBF) in 1991. However, 
SBF was not able to follow its special recovery plan and its assets were thus sold to four 
domestic commercial banks (OKO Bank, KOP, Unitas and Postbank) in October 1993. 
The risky assets of SBF were transferred to an asset management company. 
 
The analysis does not indicate KOP and SYP (Unitas) as possible sources of contagion. 
It is noteworthy that the banks' interbank lending relative to their total assets is not as 
large as in other banking groups (Table 1). Still, KOP and SYP were the main banks in 
Finland and active in the interbank market. Thus, intuitively they should be a prominent 
source of contagion. In fact, the analysis is hindered as one cannot distinguish domestic 
certificates of deposit from foreign ones. Certificates of deposit were, however, widely 
used instruments on the Finnish interbank market in the 1980s. Banks' exposures to 
short-term money markets were such that no bank would have survived the sudden dry-
up of external funding. The analysis is replicated by adding bonds and certificates of 
deposit that are reported in banks' balance sheets to interbank assets and liabilities. 
Then, all banks, except for STS -Bank and Bank of Åland, cause wide spread contagion. 
With a 100% loss ratio, the effect of contagion varies from 51.5% to 92.1% depending 
                                                                                                                                               
possible sources of contagion were OKO Bank, Postbank and Merita Bank. OKO Bank's exposure is due 
to its position as a central monetary institution. Postbank's position was not, in reality, worrisome since 
Postbank was owned by the state. Merita Bank was the largest bank in the market, formed from the 
merger of KOP and SYP (Unitas). 
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on the first failing bank. STS -Bank is so small that it is not able to cause system-wide 
effects. At the same time, Bank of Åland’s business concentrated mainly in Åland and it 
did not have enough interbank relations with mainland banks to be a starting point for 
contagion.   
 
It appears also that the magnitude of contagion
9
 was higher in the early 1990s than cur-
rently (Figure 6). The only exception is the end of 2007, when the effect of an average 
contagion with a 100% loss ratio is the most profound. Yet, the results of December 
2007 may be affected by structural changes in the banking market.  
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Figure 6. Average contagion with different loss ratios.  
 
 
The operational environment of banks in the early 1990s and the years 2005–2007 bear 
several similarities. In both periods the loan stock grew and interest rates mainly in-
creased. Also, the banking sector was highly concentrated and there were only a few 
large players in the market. However, there are also notable differences between the pe-
                                                 
9
 The magnitude of contagion is measured as a percentage share of failing banks' assets of the banking 
sector's total assets after all banks have been exposed to the effects of contagion. The assets of the first 
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riods. The 2005–2007 interest rate level was nowhere near that of the early 1990s and 
the corporate sector was not as badly indebted as before. Interbank markets became 
more international and the network of interbank markets changed. Therefore, it is highly 
unlikely that the banking crisis would happen again. The analyses also suggest that the 
negative effects of contagion on the Finnish banking sector were, on average, more lim-
ited in 2005–2007 than in the early 1990s. 
 
In simulations, the speed of contagion and the importance of the loss-given-default ratio 
follow similar patterns. At the beginning, the initial shock leads to a breakdown of sev-
eral banks, but the number of failing banks in the subsequent contagion rounds is 
smaller. Typically, there are two or three contagious rounds after which contagion stops. 
However, the speed of contagion depends on the size of the loss ratio. With the smallest 
loss rate of 25%, contagion has only first- or second-round effects. When the loss given 
default is higher, there are at least two contagious rounds. The only case when conta-
gion takes five rounds occurs in December 2007. The size of the LGD ratio has an ob-
vious effect on the results. This is intuitively appealing, since higher values of the ratio 
have the potential to increase pressure in the system. At some point, a critical mass of 
losses is reached and the interbank market collapses. The case of the maximum loss ra-
tio is theoretically interesting since it gives the ―worst case scenario‖. In the case of an 
immediate and severe banking crisis, it portrays what could happen if everything goes 
badly. While the worst case scenario might be only a theoretical possibility, the quite 
plausible 50% loss ratio seems to already have measurable effects on the banking mar-
ket.  
 
The Finnish results are in line with previous studies (Appendix 2). Especially the results 
concerning the banking sector's structure and contagion are similar. The Finnish bank-
ing sector — like that of the Netherlands — is dominated by a few large banks. Respec-
tively, the share of the banking sector's total assets affected by contagion is high, espe-
cially when loss ratios are at an exalted level. At the same time, contagion seems to 
have a somewhat milder effect in countries with multiple money-centre and two-tier 
systems (for instance, Italy and Germany). These results support the findings of Allen et 
                                                                                                                                               
failing bank are not included in the figures. Individual charts for contagion in different time periods are in 
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al. (2000), as the level of contagion depends on the structure of interbank markets. On 
the other hand, Degryse et al. (2007) find that the Belgian banking sector's increasing 
concentration decreases the risk and impact of contagion. This outcome gets some sup-
port from the Finnish case: while the concentration in the Finnish banking sector dimin-
ishes, on average, the contagion grows.
10
  
                                                                                                                                               
Appendix 1. 
10
 In Finland, the concentration (measured by the Herfindahl index) and contagion (with a 100% loss ra-
tio) were 2,730 and 9.3% in Dec. 2005, 2,560 and 26.5% in Dec. 2006 and 2,540 and 62.9% in Dec. 2007.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
This paper investigates the possibility of contagion on the Finnish interbank market. 
Contagion is defined as a crisis in which the failure of one bank causes the failure of 
other banks not directly affected by the initial shock (the so-called domino effect). The 
simulations for 2005–2007 suggest that a danger of contagion is present on the Finnish 
interbank market but that contagion is a low-probability event. Five deposit banks out of 
ten are possible starting points for contagion although the severity of contagion is condi-
tional on the first failing bank. In addition to large commercial banks, there are also 
middle-sized banks that are capable of triggering wide-ranging contagion. Across the 
different time periods, the five banks that are identified as a starting point for contagion 
remain the same.  
 
The simulations are repeated with Finnish banking crisis data. The analysis shows how 
the risk of contagion increases in the banking sector from 1988 to 1990. In the light of 
the historical knowledge, the maximum entropy methodology is able to pick up the fi-
nancial institutions that formed a systemic threat to the Finnish banking system. Al-
though banks' operational environment in 2005–2007 resembled that of the early 1990s, 
there are also notable differences between the periods. Therefore, it is highly unlikely 
that the banking crisis would happen again. The analyses also suggest that the negative 
effects of contagion on the Finnish banking market were, on average, more limited in 
2005–2007 than in the early 1990s.  
 
Recently, Mistrulli (2007) has compared the results obtained by assuming maximum 
entropy with those based on actual bilateral exposures. The comparison of results indi-
cates that the maximum entropy method tends to underrate the extent of the contagion. 
However, under certain circumstances, depending on the structure of the interbank link-
ages, the recovery rates of interbank exposures and banks' capitalisation, the maximum 
entropy method can overrate the scope of the contagion.  
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The area remaining for future research is broad. First of all, the results obtained by Mis-
trulli (2007) and the analysis of Upper (2007) show the maximum entropy method bi-
ases the results for existing contagion. The exact magnitude and direction of the distor-
tion are not known exactly. Thus there is room for better analytical methods. Secondly, 
the current set-up would benefit from behavioural analysis. Allowing banks to take re-
medial action when difficulties appear or allowing them to make exposures in net terms, 
could enrich the analysis. In addition, the analysis could take into account: the fixed 
costs of screening potential borrowers and the monitoring of loans; relationship lending; 
and different portfolio structures. Thirdly, new avenues for research open up from test-
ing how variations in exposures impact the magnitude of contagion. As current conta-
gion analyses are based on static set-ups and on individual data observations, "stress-
testing" analysis for the banking sector is needed to be able to see how variations in ex-
posures affect the risk of contagion. Finally, more evidence on the relationship between 
the concentration of the banking market and the level of contagion is needed in order to 
draw definitive conclusions on possible interconnections.  
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APPENDIX 1. Contagion in Finnish banking market 
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APPENDIX 2. Results of empirical studies on contagion 
 
Results for worst-case scenarios of empirical studies on contagion: as a percentage of balance sheet assets affected by contagion 
(excluding assets of "first domino"). 
100 % 80 % 75 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 25 % 20 % 10 % 5 %
Germany   Gross exposures, no safety net na na 76.3 % na 61.6 % 5.0 % 0.8 % na 0.6 % 0.3 %
Upper & Worms (2004)   Netting, no safety net na na 8.2 % na 1.1 % 0.9 % 0.6 % na 0.3 % 0.3 %
  With safety net na na 13.5 % na 3.0 % 0.8 % 0.8 % na 0.5 % 0.0 %
Belgium *   Domestic contagion (2002) 3.8 % 3.8 % na 3.3 % na 3.0 % na 0.5 % na na
Degryse & Nguyen (2007)   Domestic contagion (1993) 90.9 % na na 3.3 % na na na 0.0 % na na
  Foreign contagion 20.0 % 20.0 % na 18.2 % na 18.1 % na 0.1 % na na
United Kingdom   Model I: the benchmark case 25.2 % 6.7 % na 6.7 % 0.0 % 0.0 % na 0.0 % na na
Wells (2002 & 2004)   Model II: incl. large exposures data 15.7 % 15.7 % na 15.7 % 0.0 % 0.0 % na 0.0 % na na
  Model III: money-centre model 42.2 % 6.7 % na 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % na 0.0 % na na
Holland   Large exposures data 96.0 % na 90.0 % na 2.0 % na 2.0 % na na na
van Lelyveld & Liedorp (2006)   Survey data 73.0 % na 45.0 % na 3.0 % na 2.0 % na na na
Italy   The benchmark case 15.9 % 15.2 % na 7.9 % 7.9 % 7.9 % na 3.5 % 0.5 % na
Mistrulli (2007)   Conglomerate bail-outs 12.8 % 12.8 % na 12.8 % 12.8 % 12.8 % na 0.5 % 0.5 % na
Finland   Banking crises (average 1998-90) 36.8 % na 36.1 % na 26.4 % na 8.7 % na na na
Toivanen (this paper)   Current period (average 2005-07) 28.0 % na 14.5 % na 8.4 % na 3.3 % na na na
na = not available
Loss-given default
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General results of empirical studies 
 
 
Country Author(s) Results
Austria
Elsinger, Lehar & Summer 
(2002) 
The results show that the Austrian banking system is very stable and default events are unlikely. The median 
default probability of an Austrian bank is below one percent and only a small fraction of bank defaults can be 
interpreted as contagious. The vast majority of defaults are a direct consequence of macroeconomic shocks.
Belgium Degryse & Nguyen (2007) 
The results of the survey show that a change in the Belgian interbank market from a structure in which all 
banks have symmetric links towards a structure in which money centres are symmetrically linked to some 
banks, but are not linked together themselves, decreases the risk and impact of contagion. The default of 
some large foreign banks has the potential to trigger significant domino effects in Belgium. 
European 
Union
Gropp, Lo Duca & Vesala 
(2006) 
The authors find some evidence in favour of significant cross-border contagion among the banking sectors of 
the largest EU countries. Contagion may have increased since the introduction of the euro and integrated 
money market. Combined with the finding that there is no contagion among small banks, the results point 
towards a "tiered" interbank structure at the cross-border level such that small banks only deal with domestic 
counterparties, leaving foreign operations to major international banks. 
Germany Upper & Worms (2004)
Without the safety net*, there is considerable scope for contagion in Germany and it could have an effect on a 
large proportion of the German banking sector. When a safety net is in place, it considerably reduces (but 
does not eliminate) the danger of contagion. Large-scale contagion can occur only if the loss rate on 
interbank loans exceeds a value of approx. 40%.
* Upper et al. use "safety nets" refer to the guarantee funds of savings and cooperative banks. In Germany, both the savings banks' and cooperative 
banks' associations operate funds backed up by mutual guarantees which serve to recapitalise member institutions in the event of insolvency. 
In addition to guarantee funds, savings banks are also explicitly guaranteed by the relevant local or regional government. There are also a (small) 
number of public banks guaranteed by the federal government of Germany.  
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Country Author(s) Results
Italy Mistrulli (2007) 
The main results show also that Italian interbank market is conducive to financial contagion. However, even 
for high loss rates, the default of banks raising funds in the interbank market hardly triggers a systemic risk. 
Simulations also indicate that when conglomerates are allowed to recapitalise their affiliates, which otherwise 
would fail, the resilience to financial contagion of the banking system tends to improve. In some cases, 
however, due to the fact that losses are shared among banks affiliated with a conglomerate, banking stability 
may even worsen due to new channels of contagion. The comparison of results based on actual counterparty-
information indicates that the maximum entropy method tends to underrate the extent of contagion. However, 
under certain circumstances, depending on the structure of the interbank linkages, the recovery rates of 
interbank exposures and banks' capitalisation, the maximum entropy method overrates the scope of 
contagion. 
Netherlands van Lelyveld & Liedorp (2006) 
The results state that there exist considerable risks in Dutch interbank markets in case of a bankruptcy of one 
of the large banks or through foreign counterparties (especially European and North African). Bankruptcy will 
not, however, lead to a complete collapse of the interbank market. The contagion effects of the failure of a 
small bank are limited.
Sweden Blåvarg & Nimander (2002) 
The risk of contagion within the Swedish banking system is light and the effects on the Swedish system from 
abroad seem to be even smaller. The results show that financial institutions dominate banks' ranking list, that 
the largest exposures are in the foreign exchange settlement segment, that counterparties have high credit 
ratings and that the banking system is concentrated. 
Switzerland Müller (2006) 
The main findings are, first, that there is substantial potential for contagion. Second, the exposure as well as 
the credit line contagion channel exists in Switzerland. Third, a lender of last-resort intervention could reduce 
spill-over effects remarkably. And fourth, the structure of interbank markets has a considerable impact on 
markets' resilience against spill-over effects: Centralized markets are more prone to contagion than 
homogenous ones. 
Switzerland Sheldon & Maurer (1998)
Although there seems to be a high probability of a bank failure, there is no significant evidence for systemic 
risk in the Swiss banking sector. A bank's rate of assets, capital-to-asset-ratio and initial interbank lending 
affect the probability of the failure. 
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Country Author(s) Results
United 
Kingdom
Wells (2002 & 2004) 
The first model benefits from the aggregate data and assumes that banks seek to spread exposures as 
widely as possible. The results suggest that if a multiple bank failure were to occur, it would most likely be 
triggered by the assumed insolvency of a large UK-owned bank. Such a shock to the system is, however, 
deemed to be very unlikely. The second model incorporates large exposures data. It opens up the possibility 
that the insolvency of a large foreign bank could cause multiple bank failures in the UK system. However, 
when multiple failures do occur, the systemic implications seem to be somewhat less than under the first 
approach. The results of the third model are similar to those of model 1 and 2. The only exception is that for 
the higher loss-given-defaults, the credit losses of banks are more severe. All in all, a single bank failure is 
rarely sufficient to trigger the outright failure of other banks, but it does have the potential to weaken 
substantially the capital holdings of the banking system. In an extreme case, a single bank's insolvency could 
trigger knock-on effects, leading in the worst case to the failure of up to one quarter of the UK banking 
system. The results depend greatly on the assumptions maintained about the distribution of interbank loans 
and the level of loss given default.   
